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Planning & Drafting of International
Licensing Agreements
by S. John Byington*
I. Introduction
International licensing agreements are very important to the busi-
ness world, both to the small manufacturer contemplating an initial
foray into the world market and to the larger corporation with firmly
established subsidiaries abroad. This article focuses on the more practi-
cal aspects of the planning and drafting of such international licensing
agreements. Because most U.S. companies participate in these arrange-
ments as the licensors of technological know-how, it is from that perspec-
tive that this article has been written. This article will illustrate how,
through analysis of objectives and attention to external constraints, the
prospective American licensor can most advantageously draft the tech-
nology transfer agreement.
II. Advantages of Licensing Arrangements
The appeal of the licensing arrangement as a mode of transferring
technology has been enhanced in recent years by a confluence of political
and economic trends. While the number of foreign acquisitions by U.S.
industrials declined during the 1970's,' during the same decade those
companies' earnings of royalties and fees from licensing agreements in-
creased substantially. In 1967, the earnings from such arrangements
were $1.5 billion; in 1978 receipts totalled some $5.4 billion.2 These
figures reflect in part the growing number of political obstacles con-
fronting U.S. direct investment abroad. Protective tariff and import re-
striction .policies adopted by many nations have also led small
manufacturers, who in the past relied primarily upon export policies, to
seek new methods of transferring goods and technologies.
Why are U.S. companies, especially manufacturers, turning to the
licensing agreement as a substitute for, or supplement to, more tradi-
* Partner, Rogers, Hoge & Hills, Washington, D.C. Office; B.A. 1959, Ferris State Col-
lege; J.D. 1963, Georgetown University; Former National Export Marketing Director, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce; Chairman, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.
I Daniels & Patil, US Foreign Acquisitions. An Endangered Species.?, 20 MANAGEMENT INT'L
REV. 25 (1980).
2 Kroner, US International Trnsations in Rovalties & Fees, 1967-1978, SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT Bus., Jan. 1980, at 29.
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tional modes of conducting international business? Three reasons come
immediately to mind:
1. the licensing agreement requires minimal capital investment;
2. it provides income to the licensor in the form of royalties, disclo-
sure, and technical assistance fees; and
3. it enables U.S. manufacturers to benefit from a reverse flow of
technology.
First, the licensing agreement allows the American manufacturer to
invest substantially less capital in the participating foreign enterprise
than is required by the establishment of a wholly or partially owned sub-
sidiary. The risk of loss to the licensor due to political upheaval in the
host country is, therefore, significantly reduced. The minimal capital re-
quirements also serve to broaden the spectrum of those domestic manu-
facturers able to fully exploit potential foreign markets. The small
company with limited capital resources may, through licensing arrange-
ment, test the marketability of its services, know-how or products prior to
committing itself to heavy capital investment abroad. Furthermore, be-
cause less capital is needed in order to gain access to foreign markets,
more dollars can be devoted by the American manufacturer to the re-
search and development so vital to continuing technological innovations
and leadership.
Second, licensing agreements provide a steady flow of income to the
licensor in the form of royalties, disclosure fees, and technical assistance
fees. Significantly, such income is sometimes exempted from currency
restrictions. 3 Licensing fees may also receive tax treatment preferable to
that afforded the income and dividends of corporate subsidiaries. 4 While
industrialized nations tend to impose relatively high taxes on corporate
income, they often have low withholding taxes on the royalties paid by
resident licensees to foreign licensors.
Third, innovations and refinements of know-how are increasingly
the result of licensee alteration of the transferred technology. American
companies, are, therefore, fully cognizant of the benefits derived from
licensing agreements with provisions for a reverse flow of technology. In
addition to enhancing their competitive edge over alternative sources of
comparable technology, access to the ideas, expertise, and ingenuity of
3 Fisher, Foreign Likensing Check List, 51 T.M. REP. 470, 470 (1961).
4 This is particularly the case where, with prior approval from the Internal Revenue
Service, the licensors make the technology transfer package available to the foreign enterprise in
exchange for equity shares. Income from the transaction then may be treated as long-term
capital gain. See Jepsen & Zenoff, How to Boost Profik from Your Foreign Liten&g Agreement, Bus.
ABROAD, Dec. 1968, at 35. Tax laws of the particular host government and any tax treaties
should be reviewed by the potential licensor prior to entering the licensing agreement. For
more information on recent developments in the tax treatment of royalties and disclosure fees
by the United States and various international groups, see Patrick, A Comparison of the United
States and OECD Model Income Tax Conoentiow, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 613, 667 (1978);
Surrey, Reflectiom on te Allocation of Income and Erpesers Among National Tax Jusdictions, 10 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 409, 423 (1978).
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the licensee may lead to a significant reduction in the licensor's research
and development expenditures.
As previously noted, the merits of conducting international business
through licensing arrangements are substantial. Drawbacks, however, do
exist. Of concern to some American corporations is the lack of manage-
ment control over the licensee's manufacturing and marketing opera-
tions. 5 Additionally, considerable antitrust problems may arise in the
execution of licensing agreements when restraints of questionable propri-
ety are placed upon a licensee's use of transferred technology. 6 Fortu-
nately for the prospective licensor, in most business and legal
transactions these pitfalls may largely be avoided through preliminary
planning and precise draftsmanship of the licensing agreement.
HI. The Licensing Agreement
Essentially, the international licensing agreement is a contract
which transfers to a foreign enterprise technology and rights in the form
of patents, trademarks, know-how, and trade secrets. Until recent years,
these agreements generally provided for the licensing of patent rights to a
technical innovation or product. In these patent agreements, the licensor
would basically covenant not to sue the licensee for infringement under
the patent claims.
Today, however, the proprietary element most often the subject of
licensing agreements is technological know-how. 7 While no conclusive
definition of know-how can be stated, it is usually deemed to refer to the
sum of knowledge, skills, methods, and other technical information nec-
essary to the manufacturing process, which, while not patented, is not
generally known or accessible in the industry. 8 Know-how typically in-
cludes such information as recipes, blueprints, formulae, design layouts,
patterns, operating instructions, and a host of specifications, all of which
are valued for the competitive advantage in the industry they bestow
upon the recipient.
Furthermore, the licensing agreement of today, rather than transfer-
ring know-how in isolation from other aspects of the total manufacturing
process, may deliver an entire "technology package," designed to assist
and guide the licensee enterprise through each production stage. Such a
package would typically include: plant layout designs; construction, raw
5 Travaglini, Foreign Licensting andJoint Venture Arrangements, 4 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 159, 160 (1979).
6 See Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, Antitrust and the International Licensing of Trade Secrets and
Know-how. A Aedfor Guidelines, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 725 (1977); Lipson, Antitrust Problems
in Foreign Commerce, 18 PRAC. LAW., Dec. 1972 at 57; Payne & Stroup, US Antitrust Aspects of the
International Transfer of Technologp, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 91 (1980).
7 See generally Brunsvold, An International Licensing Agreement, 4 ALI-ABA CouRSE MATER-
IALS J. 103 (1979-80); Fisher, supra note 3; Unkovic, Negotiating and Preparing an International Li-
censing Agreement, 25 PRAC. LAW., Jan. 15, 1979, at 77.
8 See generally Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, supra note 6; Payne & Stroup, supra note 6;
UNIDO Guidelinesfor Evaluation of Transfer Technology Agreements, U.N. Doc. ID/233 (1979) 11-25.
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materials and equipment requirements; machinery testing, repairs and
maintenance; quality control procedures; and personnel training. These
packages are particularly attractive to those licensees located in develop-
ing nations, who seek to obtain internationally competitive technology
and production capabilities as quickly as possible.
IV. Planning and Drafting
A. Introduction
As in all business transactions, the astute licensor will engage in con-
siderable planning activities prior to the actual drafting and execution of
a licensing agreement. Development of a corporate licensing strategy, in
which the objectives sought to be maximized are outlined and the com-
plications which may arise are analyzed, is a prudent first step for any
licensor, whether it be a conglomerate or a small manufacturer. Assum-
ing that the American licensor, having made the threshold decision to
license proprietary know-how, has selected a foreign enterprise licensee
with adequate market credentials, then the negotiation and drafting of
select provisions of the agreement should proceed.
B. Provisions
The licensor, who for tactical reasons might be well advised to pres-
ent the first draft of the agreement, should attempt to secure all of the
following provisions in any licensing agreement. 9
I. Whereas Clause-As a preamble to the agreement proper, it
should include an encapsulation of the general understanding of the par-
ties, specification of the parties and of their capacity and willingness to
perform, and a means for revision of the terms of the agreement in light
of changing circumstances. Precise drafting of this clause may prevent
future complications, based on a misunderstanding of terms or intentions
between the parties.
2. Tenure-The agreement should be for a fixed, long term. A long
term allows the licensor to amortize the initial research and development
expenses over the term of the contract. Provision should also be made,
however, for predetermined times at which the parties might escape obli-
gations of the contract without incurring liability.
3. DeAfitions--Clear and precise definitions of the terms of the li-
censing contract should be set forth. Definitions of the substance of the
technology transferred, whether patent, trademark, or proprietary know-
how, should be stated, as well as definitions of transmittal arrangements.
Transmittal arrangements are procedures by which the technology is to
9 For an example of a prepared licensing agreement, se generally Brunsvold, supra note 7.
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be transferred from licensor to the licensee.' 0
4 Applicable Law-It is to the licensor's advantage that the con-
tract be executed in the United States and that the law of the state in
which the American company has its principal place of business be con-
trolling. Under present practices, parties to a licensing agreement are
free to choose a specific law to govern their relationship. " By providing
for U.S. law to govern the contract, licensors have an advantage. The
licensors have familiarity with legal ground rules and uniformity in exe-
cution and/ interpretation of all their licensing agreements.
The licensing agreement should also provide that the licensee will
obtain all host government licenses and comply with all foreign govern-
ment regulations in the administration of the terms of the contract. In
the event that a registered user agreement' 2 is required, the licensing
contract should provide for the execution thereof by the parties.
5 Q ahtyo Control-Particularly where the technology package
transferred to the licensee confers the right to use licensor trademarks
and tradenames, the licensor should, through the agreement, maintain
rigorous control over quality assurance procedures. Typically, the licen-
sor should be allowed to inspect the equipment, production records, and
manufacturing facilities of the licensee periodically. Furthermore, the li-
censor should expressly retain control over all design changes, modifica-
tions, and quality standards of the transferred goods.
Depending upon the bargaining position of the parties, the licensor
should seek to obtain a broad power to terminate the licensing arrange-
ment whenever, in his judgment, the licensee's production is such that it
adversely affects the licensor's best interest.13
10 See generally UNIDO Guideie for Evaluation of Transfer Technology Agrement, supra note 8;
Unkovic, supra note 7.
1" It is important to keep in mind, however, that in adopting a finalized international
Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) will most probably follow recommendations of the Group of 77
which call for application of the licensee's national law in all contracts concerning technology
transfer. See Revised Text of Draft of Outline of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer
of Technology: Submitted on Behalf of the Experts from the Group of 77, Annex 1, UNCTAD
Doc. TD/AC.l/4 (Nov. 30, 1976). For more information on UNCTAD and EEC Draft Codifi-
cations affecting party autonomy in licensing, see Dessemontet, Transfer of Technology Under
UNCTAD and EEC Draft Codi*ations. A European View on Choice of Law in Licineing, 12 J. Ir'L L.
& ECoN. 1 (1979).
12 Registered user agreements are required by many developing countries before a tech-
nology transfer agreement will be deemed enforceable and legal by the host government. Typi-
cal of such a regulation is that of Mexico which requires compulsory registration of all licensing
agreements with the National Registry for the Transfer of Technology. Registration, which
establishes that the "permitted [registered] user" is the owner of limited proprietary rights
within the territory for the particular class of goods or technology, enables the host government
to control the price, type and quality of technology that is introduced within its national bor-
ders. See generally Barnes, Technology Transfer Rules: A Study n Comparative Law, 3 B.C. INT'L &
CoMp. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979).
13 Unkovic, supra note 7, at 81.
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6 Secrecy Clause-Because much of the value of the licensor's trans-
ferred technology lies in its confidential nature, a secrecy provision is fun-
damental to the well-drafted licensing agreement. This provision should
at a minimum recite the confidential nature of the know-how and set
forth the requirement that such confidentiality be strictly maintained.
The cautious licensor should demand that appropriate employees and
independent contractors of the licensee sign agreements prohibiting dis-
closure.
7. Assignability and Sublicensing-The agreement should specify
whether sublicensing or assignment of the contract rights will be allowed
and, if so, under what conditions. It is advisable that the licensor, in
order to maintain control over the use of his proprietary know-how, pat-
ents, or trademarks, restrict the licensee's right to assign or sublicense to
those instances in which express consent of the licensor has been ob-
tained.
8. Grant-backs-In a grant-back provision, the licensee agrees to
transfer back to the licensor information and nonexclusive rights to any
future technical improvements of the licensor's know-how or patent that
the licensee may develop. When such a grant-back is non-exclusive, and
where the licensor has similarly agreed to furnish the foreign enterprise
with technological information during the term of the contract, the pro-
vision appears to be equitably and validly drafted.
Because anti-trust problems may arise, the licensor should exercise
great care while drafting provisions of this nature. Generally, a rule of
reason is followed to determine the validity of grant-back provisions. If it
is reasonably necessary to protect the licensor, is not a disincentive to
licensee's innovation, does not extend beyond the scope of the transferred
technology, and does not otherwise unreasonably restrict competition,
then a grant-back will probably be deemed valid. 14
9. Royaltes-Most licensing agreements generate income in the
form of royalties. These payments to the licensor are generally made in
two forms:
i. A single "lump sum" payment at the time of the initial technol-
ogy transfer; or
ii. A combination of initial payment credited against a set number
of units produced via the technology, and a "running" royalty per unit
produced over the term of the agreement. 1
5
14 Payne & Stroup, supra note 8, at 109. See also Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v.
Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp.
648 (D.S.C. 1977), modifudper curiam, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979). See general4' Chevigny, The
Validity of Crani-Back Areements under the Antitrust Laws, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 569 (1966); Wal-
lace, Overlooked Opportnities-Making the Most out of United States Anti- Trust Limitations on Interna-
tional Licensing Practies, 10 INT'L LAw. 275, 281 (1976).
15 Unkovic, supra note 7, at 81.
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For a variety of reasons, the running royalty has enjoyed greater appeal
as the form of payment to licensors.
The royalty amounts, which are usually formulated against the sales
price or sales value of the good, are determined by a variety of factors,
including:
i. The relative bargaining positions of the parties;
ii. Industry-wide standards and practices;
iii. Extent of territorial scope in the license; and
iv. Value of the proprietary information transferred.16
The licensor, of course, should seek to obtain royalties that are both
reasonable and recoverable. To this end, the well-drafted licensing
agreement should also contain clauses which:
i. Allow for future renegotiation of the royalty payments at peri-
odic intervals;
ii. Assure a minimum guaranteed annual return to the licensor
which is reasonable and fair to both parties. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the licensor should consult local law on this point as the regu-
latory agencies of many foreign countries do not permit minimum
foreign royalty clauses;
iii. Allow the licensor to cancel the agreement should it, due to
unforeseen circumstances, become impossible to remit currency to the
United States; or, in the alternative, provide for mandatory deposits in
local currency in the licensor's name by the licensee; and
iv. Enable the licensor to terminate the agreement upon the insol-
vency or bankruptcy of the licensee, with reciprocal rights extended to
the licensee.
Additionally, some licensors may opt to receive, in lieu of royalty
income, corporate shares in the licensee manufacturing enterprise. This
equity interest may be favored because it assists the licensor in maintain-
ing control over the venture.
10. Service Fees-In addition to provisions which assure the licensor
a recovery of reasonable and fair royalties, the licensing agreement
should also contain a clause which provides remuneration for services
rendered by the licensor to the licensee enterprise in furtherance of the
goals of the agreement. The agreement should indicate rates of remuner-
ation for such services as technical assistance, personnel training, and
management and engineering consultancy services.
//. Arbiration-The potential for disputes arising between parties
to international licensing agreements is considerable. Despite careful
drafting and outlining of the parties' intentions, misunderstandings often
occur due to cultural and linguistic differences. It is usually desirable,
therefore, to provide for arbitration in such an event.
Arbitration is recognized in most countries as a legal substitute for
i6 Se geneTraly Fisher, supra note 3, at 472-76; UNIDO Guidelinsfor Evaluation of Transfer
Technology Agreement, supra note 8.
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lengthy judicial dispute settlement. Once incorporated into the licensing
agreement, the arbitration clause should either specify procedures to be
followed or designate the use of a recognized and reputable arbitration
association, such as the American Arbitration Association or the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce.
12. Termination Rights-As noted earlier, a separate clause permit-
ting early termination upon the occurrence of certain contingencies is
very common in the licensing agreement, and is desirable for the U.S.
licensor. Such contingencies include the bankruptcy or insolvency of ei-
ther party, failure to adopt quality control procedures, and production in
such a manner as to adversely affect the licensor's interests. In any case,
the licensing agreement should provide that in the event of termination,
all patents, trademarks, and technical assets are assigned to the licensor.
The American licensor will also want to make sure that the agreement
includes a "momentum clause" to ensure that, in the event of termina-
tion of the agreement, the licensor will continue to enjoy royalties on
those inventories generated during the contract period.
V. External Constraints
In the preceding text, the objectives of the licensor were, to a certain
extent, treated as if they were formulated in a vacuum. In reality, the
final terms of the licensing agreement are the end product of a bargain-
ing process in which the licensee enterprise is acquiring an increasingly
leveraged position. The objectives of the prospective licensee and its host
government may often be diametrically opposed to those of the licensor.
Additionally, the licensor will be well advised to tailor his objectives to
those deemed valid under antitrust laws and foreign regulations. Thus,
external constraints function to limit the American manufacturers' abil-
ity to solely dictate the terms of the licensing agreement. The licensor's
ultimate objective, therefore, will be to maximize its business benefits in
light of these constraints.
A. United States Antitrust Legislation 17
The antitrust provisions most often applied to restraints in technol-
ogy transfer agreements are sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' 8 Sec-
tion 1 defines as illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trusts
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states or with foreign nations."' 19 Section 2 expands upon the
preceding section to declare that it is illegal to "monopolize or attempt to
17 See generally J. BARANSON, INDUSTRIAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY BY U.S. FIRMS
UNDER LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS: POLICIES, PRACTICES & CONDITIONING FACTORS
(National Science Foundation 1977); Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, supra note 8; Lipson, supra note 6;
Payne & Stroup, supra note 8; Wallace, supra note 14.
1s 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
19 Id § 1.
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monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states
or with foreign nations." 20 Section 5 (1)(1) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act21 has also been applied to restraints in licensing agreements
which are deemed to be "unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce."
22
It should be kept in mind, at this juncture, that international licens-
ing agreements, by and of themselves, are not violative of the antitrust
laws. Only when the licensor places restrictions on the use of the trans-
ferred proprietary information do antitrust problems arise. Restrictive
provisions, which if incorporated into a licensing agreement would. most
probably trigger expensive and time-consuming antitrust litigation, are
as follows. 23
1. Pnce Lnitations-These are provisions by which the licensor sets
the price of the licensed products, such as vertical price fixing.
2. T-Ins-A tie-in provision is one by which the licensor, exercis-
ing its superior bargaining positions, requires the licensee to take an item,
such as a component part, as a condition to obtaining the item which the
licensee requires.
3. Ti-Ous-These provisions are similar to tie-in restrictions ex-
cept that the licensor here restricts the licensee's freedom to buy goods
from a competitor.
4. Fields of Use--This is a restriction by which the licensor limits
the product or industrial use to which his transferred technology can be
applied.
Other restrictive clauses that raise serious antitrust problems are exclu-
sive dealing requirements, quantity or volume restrictions, veto power
clauses, post-expiration royalties, and agreements tending to restrict fu-
ture licensing by a licensee.
The antitrust rules governing the applicability of the antitrust laws
to questionable restrictions in licensing agreements have emerged, for the
most part, from the judicial treatment of international territorial restric-
tions. In territorial restrictions, the licensor restricts the geographical
area in which the licensee can sell the products made by the technology.
To determine the validity of trading area restraints, courts have re-
2 Id § 2.
21 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
22 Id § 45(a)(1) (1976).
23 Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, supra note 6, at 734.
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lied on the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints. 24 According to this doc-
trine, in order to be a lawful restraint, the restriction must be ancillary to
fulfillment of the lawful primary purpose of the agreement, the scope
and duration of the restraint must be no greater than is necessary to
support the primary purpose, and the restriction must be reasonable
under the circumstances.
While affirming the principle that reasonable restraints may be per-
missible if ancillary to the primary purpose of the licensing contract, the
Department of Justice has, however, described agreements which adopt
territorial restrictions as "highly suspect."'25 When territorial restraints
operate in a cartel-like fashion to divide the world market between two
competitors, the restrictions will most likely be considered unreasonable
and illegal.
B. Foreign Constraints
In drafting the licensing agreement, the American company must
consider the constraints imposed by foreign entities on licensing agree-
ments as well as those enforced by the U.S. government. For the U.S.
licensor, these restrictions will be encountered primarily in the form of
restrictive regulations imposed by the host government. Supranational
economic organizations, such as the European Common Market, how-
ever, have also adopted antitrust regulations which affect the conduct of
licensing agreements.
The antitrust laws of the Common Market are set forth in articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.26 These provisions, modeled after sections
I and 2 of the Sherman Act, forbid the "abusive exploitation of a domi-
nant position in the European Community market and prohibit agree-
ments that restrict or distort competition within the Common Market
[and regulate] . . . restrictive agreements including operating agree-
ments entered into in connection with joint ventures and mergers."'27
While the European Community has strictly enforced prohibitions
against price-fixing, market boycotts, and the like, it has tended to en-
courage the transfer of technology and the conduct of international li-
censing agreements. Thus, while some licensing agreements may violate
the strict provisions of article 85(1), such agreements will not be pro-
scribed if they are found to benefit the public interest. 28 Just such a
benefit was found to exist in the case of a restrictive licensing agreement
24 Id at 735 n. 46, 735-37 (citing United States v. Addiston Pipe & Steel Corp., 85 F. 271,
282 (6th Cir. 1898), afdas modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
25 Id. at 741-43 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 28-31 (1977), repnndin 119771 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799,
and 12 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 15 (1977)).
26 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11. See generall Barnes, supra note 12, at 7-8; Lipson, supra note 6, at 61.
27 Lipson, supra note 6, at 61-62.
28 Barnes, supra note 12, at 8.
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between two French and German clock manufacturers. 29 The parties to
the agreement proposed to restrict themselves to the manufacture and
marketing of different time pieces within the European Community. Re-
fusing to prohibit the agreement under article 85 of the Rome Treaty,
the European Commission noted the non-dominant nature of the compa-
nies and the public benefit derived from the resulting improved technol-
ogy and productivity.3 0
Thus, while the purpose of the U.S. antitrust laws is to foster open
and free competition between companies in the market, thereby en-
gendering technological innovation, the European Commission weighs
the public benefit created by a particular restraint of trade provision
prior to determining its validity. Moreover, individual member coun-
tries may adopt and enforce antitrust regulations which have entirely
different purposes from those of the enactments just mentioned.
Indeed, many of the developing nations, through regulatory agen-
cies, seek to control and restrict the entry of technology into the national
market. Legislation, such as Mexico's 1973 Law on the Transfer of Tech-
nology,3 1 which requires government approval for all technology agree-
ments with foreign companies, is proliferating among developing nations
seeking to gain valuable time and save scarce resources through preven-
tion of duplicative technological development.
Because antitrust laws are in effect almost universally, the licensor
should, upon negotiating with a prospective licensee, carefully review the
regulations and laws of the host country. Generally, restrictions imposed
by individual countries on licensing agreements will relate to royalty pro-
visions, confidentiality requirements, and terminal rights. The prudent
licensor may, therefore, find it desirable to have an attorney who prac-
tices in the licensee's home country review these specific clauses of the
draft agreement to ensure their compatibility with local law.
VI. Conclusion
International licensing agreements are of great promise to the Amer-
ican business world. With careful planning and drafting, such agree-
ments can be extremely helpful to U.S. companies. The economic and
political ramifications briefly discussed in this article must be considered
in addition to the legal aspects of such transactions.
Furthermore, both the lawyer drafting and the company participat-
ing in the licensing agreement must keep their eyes to the future. It is
not enough to know what the law in this field is today. One must discern
. 29 Lipson, rumpra note 6, at 62 (citing In re Jaz S.A.'s Agreement, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. 5
(No. L195) (Aug. 7, 1970), 9 COMM. MKT. L.,. 129 (1970)).
0 Id.
31 D.O., Dec. 30, 1972, described and translated in Mackinney, New Foreign Investment Laws
of Mexico, in LEGAL AsPFcTs OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 31, 32 n.4 (L.Q.C. Lamar Soc'y
of Int'l L., Univ. Miss. 1977).
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future trends and conduct oneself accordingly. By so doing, one's
chances for a successful bout in the licensing arena are tremendously en-
hanced.
Question and Answer Period
Question: Your remarks suggest that the licensor should try to con-
trol product design as implemented by the licensee?
Mr. Byington: Yes.
Question: Would not such control exercised by the licensor increase
the licensee's exposure to product liability and standards violations
under the local law of the licensor's country?
Mr. Byington: The answer is "probably." However, I think, at least
at the moment, most of the licensors are willing to take a look at that,
simply because the whole basis for the licensing arrangement is such that
it's critical to maintain these controls. I've never been involved in a li-
censing agreement nor have I seen a licensing agreement where the licen-
see is free to make design changes as he sees fit without going back to the
licensor. So I think the answer is "yes." If product liability is going to
start moving up through the licensing chain, that may be the case. We
talked this morning about the whole evolving area of product liability,
and God only knows where it's going. Who knows whether or not fore-
seeable misuse in France can go back up the licensing tree to a U.S. licen-
sor? Who would argue that they could not possibly foresee French
misuse, because nobody in America would ever do that. I really don't
have any idea.
Question: Considering the trend of any technology to become
known after a period of time, what would you consider a normal term for
requiring a licensee to hold a trade secret in confidence? Five, ten or
fifteen years?Mr. Byington: I don't know that there is an answer in terms of "nor-
mal." I think it's based on the realities of how long a confidential term
you can get in your negotiations. Obviously the longer the better. If you
are in a high technology, fast-changing industry and you feel five years of
absolute confidentiality is adequate in your particular area of the busi-
ness, or you need ten or fifteen years-it's going to change the nature of
the business you're involved in, and it's also going to be a factor in your
negotiations. The rule of thumb is to start with the longest amount of
time you can possibly get. In fact, some of the boilerplate licensing
agreements include confidentiality for the life of the contract. You may
not get that, but you start by asking. One thing you have to keep in
mind in negotiating any kind of agreement, a licensing agreement in par-
ticular, is getting to know the other party. When you make an export
sales agreement you've got a reasonably arm's-length transaction, and
you're just selling your finished product. Also, when you're making di-
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rect foreign investment and building your own plant and that type of
thing, you've got very tight control. However, where you have a joint
venture or a licensing agreement, you literally have a commercial mar-
riage occur between the parties. We strongly recommend the so-called
foreign approach of getting to know your licensee very well before you
start signing everything. Don't try the typical U.S. method of flying in
on Saturday night, recovering on Sunday, and then trying to negotiate
your licensing agreement on Monday and Tuesday. Particularly in li-
censing, that approach is a recipe for disaster. Getting a good deal for
both parties involves using common sense, practical application of the
marketplace, business determinations, and hard-nosed decisions about
what is in your interest. Then, try to capture this in the best possible
way, and use English. Stop fooling around with the super-legalese and
try to write down in the simplest way what it is that you're both in-
tending to achieve. The answer in relation to a trade secret is, pick those
things that are critical in terms of the trade secret and don't use an um-
brella for everything. Pick what you've got to have and then work
around the rest, instead of saying that all the doors have to be locked, all
your people have to be bonded, etc. You should be much more narrow
and selective. You've got a better chance of not only gaining what you
want, but also ending up with a mechanism that will work for you.

